📄 الوصف (الإنجليزية)
SIMalliance Toolbox Browser Command Injection Vulnerability — SIMalliance Toolbox Browser contains an command injection vulnerability that could allow remote attackers to retrieve location and IMEI information or execute a range of other attacks by modifying the attack message.
🤖 ملخص AI
CVE-2019-16256 is a critical command injection vulnerability (CVSS 9.0) in the SIMalliance Toolbox Browser (S@T Browser), a technology embedded in SIM cards used by mobile network operators worldwide. Remote attackers can exploit this vulnerability — known as 'SimJacker' — by sending specially crafted SMS messages to target devices without any user interaction, enabling retrieval of device location, IMEI information, and execution of arbitrary commands. The attack requires no physical access and victims receive no visible indication of compromise, making it particularly dangerous for mass surveillance and targeted espionage. An active exploit is publicly available, significantly elevating the urgency for telecom operators and affected organizations to implement mitigations immediately.
📄 الوصف (العربية)
🤖 التحليل الذكي آخر تحليل: Apr 14, 2026 15:33
🇸🇦 التأثير على المملكة العربية السعودية
This vulnerability poses an exceptionally high risk to Saudi Arabia's telecommunications and critical infrastructure sectors. Telecom operators including STC, Mobily, and Zain KSA are directly at risk if their SIM card inventory includes S@T Browser-enabled SIMs. Government officials, military personnel, and executives at ARAMCO, SABIC, and financial institutions using affected SIM cards could be silently tracked and surveilled. The banking sector (under SAMA oversight) faces risks of targeted fraud through device tracking and IMEI harvesting. Given Saudi Arabia's high mobile penetration rate and the prevalence of IoT/M2M SIM deployments in Vision 2030 smart city and industrial projects, the attack surface is substantial. National security implications are severe as the vulnerability enables state-level surveillance capabilities against Saudi citizens and government personnel. NCA-regulated entities with mobile workforce and field operations are particularly exposed.
🏢 القطاعات السعودية المتأثرة
Telecom
Government
Banking
Energy
Healthcare
Defense
Smart Cities / Vision 2030 IoT
⚖️ درجة المخاطر السعودية (AI)
9.4
/ 10.0
🔧 Remediation Steps (English)
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (0-24 hours):
1. Telecom operators (STC, Mobily, Zain KSA): Audit SIM card inventory to identify S@T Browser-enabled SIMs and determine percentage of affected subscriber base.
2. Implement SMS firewall rules at the network level to block binary SMS messages (specifically OTA SMS using UDH headers associated with S@T commands) from unauthorized senders.
3. Block or filter SMS messages containing S@T Browser command headers (specifically GSM 03.48 OTA messages targeting SIM Toolkit applications).
4. Notify enterprise and government customers with high-risk profiles about potential exposure.
PATCHING GUIDANCE:
1. Contact SIM card vendors (Gemalto, Giesecke+Devrient, Oberthur, etc.) to obtain updated SIM firmware that disables or patches the S@T Browser functionality.
2. Plan and execute SIM replacement campaigns for high-risk subscriber segments (government, military, executives, critical infrastructure workers).
3. Apply the SIMalliance patch/update if available from your SIM vendor; verify patch applicability per SIM batch and manufacturer.
4. Disable S@T Browser via OTA SIM update if supported by your SIM management platform.
COMPENSATING CONTROLS:
1. Deploy or upgrade SMS firewall solutions to inspect and block malicious binary SMS traffic at the SMSC level.
2. Implement anomaly detection for unusual SIM Toolkit activity patterns in network monitoring systems.
3. For high-value targets, consider issuing replacement SIMs with S@T Browser disabled or using eSIM solutions.
4. Restrict OTA SMS delivery to whitelisted sender addresses only.
5. Enable logging of all binary SMS and SIM Toolkit interactions for forensic purposes.
DETECTION RULES:
1. Monitor for binary SMS messages (Data Coding Scheme indicating binary content) sent to subscribers from unknown or suspicious short codes.
2. Alert on unusual location update frequency or IMEI query patterns in HLR/HSS logs.
3. Implement SIEM rules to detect bulk binary SMS campaigns targeting multiple subscribers.
4. Monitor for SS7/Diameter anomalies that may accompany SimJacker exploitation chains.
5. Review CDRs for unexpected MO SMS responses from devices that should not be generating them.
🔧 خطوات المعالجة (العربية)
الإجراءات الفورية (0-24 ساعة):
1. مشغلو الاتصالات (STC، موبايلي، زين السعودية): مراجعة مخزون شرائح SIM لتحديد الشرائح التي تحتوي على متصفح S@T وتحديد نسبة المشتركين المتأثرين.
2. تطبيق قواعد جدار حماية SMS على مستوى الشبكة لحجب رسائل SMS الثنائية من المرسلين غير المصرح لهم.
3. حجب أو تصفية رسائل SMS التي تحتوي على رؤوس أوامر متصفح S@T.
4. إخطار العملاء من المؤسسات والجهات الحكومية ذات الملفات عالية المخاطر بشأن التعرض المحتمل.
إرشادات التصحيح:
1. التواصل مع موردي شرائح SIM للحصول على تحديثات البرامج الثابتة التي تعطل أو تصحح وظيفة متصفح S@T.
2. التخطيط وتنفيذ حملات استبدال شرائح SIM لشرائح المشتركين عالية المخاطر.
3. تطبيق التصحيح المتاح من مورد شريحة SIM والتحقق من قابلية التطبيق لكل دفعة.
4. تعطيل متصفح S@T عبر تحديث OTA للشريحة إذا كان مدعوماً.
ضوابط التعويض:
1. نشر أو ترقية حلول جدار حماية SMS لفحص وحجب حركة مرور SMS الثنائية الضارة.
2. تطبيق اكتشاف الشذوذ لأنماط نشاط SIM Toolkit غير المعتادة.
3. للأهداف عالية القيمة، النظر في إصدار شرائح SIM بديلة مع تعطيل متصفح S@T.
4. تقييد تسليم OTA SMS لعناوين المرسلين المدرجة في القائمة البيضاء فقط.
5. تفعيل تسجيل جميع تفاعلات SMS الثنائية وSIM Toolkit.
قواعد الكشف:
1. مراقبة رسائل SMS الثنائية المرسلة للمشتركين من رموز قصيرة مجهولة أو مشبوهة.
2. التنبيه على تكرار تحديثات الموقع غير المعتادة أو أنماط استعلام IMEI في سجلات HLR/HSS.
3. تطبيق قواعد SIEM للكشف عن حملات SMS الثنائية الجماعية.
4. مراقبة شذوذات SS7/Diameter المصاحبة لسلاسل استغلال SimJacker.
5. مراجعة CDRs للاستجابات غير المتوقعة من الأجهزة.
📋 خريطة الامتثال التنظيمي
🟢 NCA ECC 2024
ECC-2-1: Cybersecurity Risk Management — identification and treatment of critical telecom infrastructure risks
ECC-2-3: Cybersecurity in Third Parties and Cloud Computing — SIM vendor supply chain security
ECC-3-3: Network Security — SMS firewall and OTA communication protection
ECC-3-5: Mobile Device Security — protection of mobile subscriber data and device integrity
ECC-4-1: Cybersecurity Event and Incident Management — detection and response to SimJacker attacks
ECC-1-3: Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures — OTA SIM management security policies
🔵 SAMA CSF
3.3 Cyber Security Operations — monitoring for binary SMS attacks and SIM Toolkit anomalies
3.4 Third-Party Cyber Security — SIM card vendor security assessment and patch management
3.2 Cyber Security Risk Management — assessment of S@T Browser exposure in mobile banking customers
3.1 Cyber Security Governance — executive awareness of SimJacker threat to banking operations
3.5 Customer Data Protection — protection of customer location and IMEI data from unauthorized access
🟡 ISO 27001:2022
A.8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities — patching S@T Browser in SIM inventory
A.8.20 Networks security — SMS firewall implementation and OTA traffic filtering
A.5.23 Information security for use of cloud services — OTA SIM management platform security
A.8.16 Monitoring activities — detection of anomalous SIM Toolkit and binary SMS activity
A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships — SIM vendor security requirements
A.6.8 Information security event reporting — reporting SimJacker incidents to NCA/CITC
🟣 PCI DSS v4.0
Requirement 1.3 — Network access controls to restrict unauthorized SMS-based access to payment systems
Requirement 6.3 — Security vulnerabilities in SIM-based authentication components used in payment flows
Requirement 12.3 — Risk assessment for mobile devices used in cardholder data environments
Requirement 8.6 — Authentication management for mobile devices potentially compromised via SimJacker
🔗 المراجع والمصادر 0
لا توجد مراجع.
📦 المنتجات المتأثرة 1 منتج
SIMalliance:Toolbox Browser