Trivy is a security scanner. On March 19, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.4 release, force-push 76 of 77 version tags in `aquasecurity/trivy-action` to credential-stealing malware, and replace all 7 tags in `aquasecurity/setup-trivy` with malicious commits. This incident is a continuation of the supply chain attack that began in late February 2026. Following the initial disclosure on March 1, credential rotation was performed but was not atomic (not all credentials were revoked simultaneously). The attacker could have use a valid token to exfiltrate newly rotated secrets during the rotation window (which lasted a few days). This could have allowed the attacker to retain access and execute the March 19 attack. Affected components include the `aquasecurity/trivy` Go / Container image version 0.69.4, the `aquasecurity/trivy-action` GitHub Action versions 0.0.1 – 0.34.2 (76/77), and the`aquasecurity/setup-trivy` GitHub Action versions 0.2.0 – 0.2.6, prior to the recreation of 0.2.6 with a safe commit. Known safe versions include versions 0.69.2 and 0.69.3 of the Trivy binary, version 0.35.0 of trivy-action, and version 0.2.6 of setup-trivy. Additionally, take other mitigations to ensure the safety of secrets. If there is any possibility that a compromised version ran in one's environment, all secrets accessible to affected pipelines must be treated as exposed and rotated immediately. Check whether one's organization pulled or executed Trivy v0.69.4 from any source. Remove any affected artifacts immediately. Review all workflows using `aquasecurity/trivy-action` or `aquasecurity/setup-trivy`. Those who referenced a version tag rather than a full commit SHA should check workflow run logs from March 19–20, 2026 for signs of compromise. Look for repositories named `tpcp-docs` in one's GitHub organization. The presence of such a repository may indicate that the fallback exfiltration mechanism was triggered and secrets were successfully stolen. Pin GitHub Actions to full, immutable commit SHA hashes, don't use mutable version tags.
A critical supply chain attack compromised Trivy security scanner and related GitHub Actions through stolen credentials on March 19, 2026. Malicious versions (Trivy v0.69.4, trivy-action 0.0.1-0.34.2, setup-trivy 0.2.0-0.2.6) were published containing credential-stealing malware. Organizations using these versions in CI/CD pipelines face immediate risk of secret exfiltration and unauthorized access to their infrastructure and repositories.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (within 24 hours):
1. Identify all usage: Search GitHub organization for workflows using aquasecurity/trivy-action or aquasecurity/setup-trivy; check container registries for Trivy v0.69.4 images
2. Revoke all secrets: Immediately rotate ALL credentials accessible to affected CI/CD pipelines (GitHub tokens, cloud API keys, database passwords, SSH keys, container registry credentials)
3. Remove malicious artifacts: Delete Trivy v0.69.4 from all registries and build systems; remove affected GitHub Action versions from workflows
4. Check for exfiltration: Search GitHub organization for repositories named 'tpcp-docs' (fallback exfiltration mechanism indicator)
PATCHING GUIDANCE:
1. Upgrade Trivy binary to v0.69.2, v0.69.3, or later safe versions
2. Update trivy-action to v0.35.0 or later
3. Update setup-trivy to v0.2.6 (recreated safe version) or later
4. Pin all GitHub Actions to full commit SHA hashes, NOT mutable version tags (e.g., use 'abc123def456...' not 'v0.35.0')
COMPENSATING CONTROLS (if immediate patching impossible):
1. Disable affected workflows until patched
2. Use alternative security scanning tools (Snyk, Aqua, Grype) temporarily
3. Implement secret scanning in CI/CD logs to detect exfiltration attempts
4. Enable GitHub Actions audit logging and monitor for suspicious activity
5. Restrict GitHub Actions to specific IP ranges if possible
DETECTION RULES:
1. Monitor workflow logs for March 19-20, 2026 executions of trivy-action or setup-trivy
2. Alert on any new repository creation matching pattern 'tpcp-docs'
3. Detect outbound HTTPS connections from CI/CD runners to unknown domains
4. Monitor for unexpected credential usage patterns post-March 19
5. Check git logs for force-pushed tags in aquasecurity repositories
6. Scan container images for malware signatures associated with this campaign
الإجراءات الفورية (خلال 24 ساعة):
1. تحديد الاستخدام: ابحث في منظمة GitHub عن سير العمل باستخدام aquasecurity/trivy-action أو aquasecurity/setup-trivy
2. إلغاء جميع الأسرار: قم بتدوير جميع بيانات الاعتماد المتاحة لخطوط أنابيب CI/CD (رموز GitHub، مفاتيح API السحابية، كلمات مرور قواعد البيانات)
3. إزالة الأشياء الخبيثة: احذف Trivy v0.69.4 من جميع السجلات وأنظمة البناء
4. التحقق من التسرب: ابحث عن مستودعات باسم 'tpcp-docs'
إرشادات التصحيح:
1. ترقية Trivy إلى v0.69.2 أو v0.69.3 أو إصدارات آمنة لاحقة
2. تحديث trivy-action إلى v0.35.0 أو أحدث
3. تحديث setup-trivy إلى v0.2.6 (الإصدار الآمن المعاد إنشاؤه) أو أحدث
4. تثبيت جميع إجراءات GitHub على بصمات SHA كاملة، وليس العلامات القابلة للتغيير
الضوابط البديلة:
1. تعطيل سير العمل المتأثر حتى يتم التصحيح
2. استخدام أدوات فحص أمان بديلة مؤقتاً
3. تنفيذ فحص الأسرار في سجلات CI/CD
4. تمكين تسجيل GitHub Actions والمراقبة
5. تقييد إجراءات GitHub بنطاقات IP محددة
قواعد الكشف:
1. مراقبة سجلات سير العمل لتنفيذ trivy-action في 19-20 مارس
2. تنبيه عند إنشاء مستودع جديد يطابق 'tpcp-docs'
3. كشف اتصالات HTTPS الصادرة غير المتوقعة من عدائي CI/CD
4. مراقبة أنماط استخدام بيانات الاعتماد غير المتوقعة
5. فحص صور الحاويات للتوقيعات الخبيثة