📄 Description (English)
FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the MikroTik router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/mikrotik_plugin/fastnetmon_mikrotik.php (lines 107-108) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). This is identical in pattern to the Juniper plugin vulnerability. The $msg variable contains unsanitized attack data from command-line arguments. An attacker who can influence argv[] values can inject arbitrary shell commands. The fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg().
🤖 AI Executive Summary
FastNetMon Community Edition versions through 1.2.9 contain a critical OS command injection vulnerability in the MikroTik router integration plugin. The _log() function unsafely concatenates user-controlled input directly into shell commands via exec(), allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability mirrors a previously disclosed Juniper plugin flaw and poses significant risk to network monitoring infrastructure in Saudi organizations.
📄 Description (Arabic)
🤖 AI Intelligence Analysis Analyzed: May 31, 2026 06:37
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia Impact Assessment
This vulnerability directly impacts Saudi telecommunications providers (STC, Mobily, Zain) and government entities (NCA, CITC) that deploy FastNetMon for DDoS detection and network monitoring on MikroTik infrastructure. Energy sector organizations (ARAMCO, SEC) using MikroTik routers with FastNetMon monitoring are at risk of command injection leading to network compromise, data exfiltration, and service disruption. Banking sector (SAMA-regulated institutions) relying on FastNetMon for network security monitoring could face unauthorized access to sensitive network traffic and logs. The vulnerability is particularly critical in Saudi Arabia where MikroTik routers are widely deployed in ISP and enterprise networks.
🏢 Affected Saudi Sectors
Telecommunications (STC, Mobily, Zain)
Government (NCA, CITC, Ministry of Interior)
Energy (ARAMCO, SEC)
Banking (SAMA-regulated institutions)
Healthcare (MOH facilities with network monitoring)
ISP Infrastructure
Enterprise Networks
🎯 MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
⚖️ Saudi Risk Score (AI)
8.4
/ 10.0
🔧 Remediation Steps (English)
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:
1. Identify all FastNetMon Community Edition deployments with MikroTik plugin enabled (check /etc/fastnetmon/fastnetmon.conf for mikrotik_plugin setting)
2. Disable MikroTik plugin immediately: comment out 'mikrotik_plugin = on' in configuration
3. Review FastNetMon process logs for suspicious command patterns or unexpected process execution
4. Audit MikroTik router access logs for unauthorized commands executed during vulnerability window
PATCHING GUIDANCE:
1. Monitor Pavel Odintsov's FastNetMon GitHub repository for patched version (upgrade to 1.3.0 or later when available)
2. No official patch currently available; implement compensating controls immediately
3. Subscribe to FastNetMon security advisories at https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon/security
COMPENSATING CONTROLS:
1. Replace exec() calls with file_put_contents() for logging: file_put_contents($FILE_LOG_TMP, date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . ' - [FASTNETMON] - ' . escapeshellarg($msg) . PHP_EOL, FILE_APPEND)
2. If patching unavailable, use escapeshellarg() on all $msg variables: exec('echo `date` "- [FASTNETMON] - ' . escapeshellarg($msg) . '" >> ' . escapeshellarg($FILE_LOG_TMP))
3. Implement strict input validation on command-line arguments before passing to FastNetMon
4. Run FastNetMon with minimal privileges (dedicated non-root user)
5. Implement Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to block command injection patterns in FastNetMon API calls
DETECTION RULES:
1. Monitor for exec() calls with unsanitized variables in /src/mikrotik_plugin/fastnetmon_mikrotik.php
2. Alert on FastNetMon process spawning unexpected child processes (bash, sh, cmd.exe)
3. Monitor system logs for commands executed by FastNetMon user containing shell metacharacters (|, ;, &, $(), `)
4. IDS/IPS signature: detect patterns like 'echo.*date.*FASTNETMON.*exec' in FastNetMon configuration or logs
5. File integrity monitoring on fastnetmon_mikrotik.php to detect unauthorized modifications
🔧 خطوات المعالجة (العربية)
الإجراءات الفورية:
1. تحديد جميع نشرات FastNetMon Community Edition مع تفعيل مكون MikroTik (تحقق من /etc/fastnetmon/fastnetmon.conf)
2. تعطيل مكون MikroTik فوراً: علّق 'mikrotik_plugin = on' في الإعدادات
3. مراجعة سجلات عملية FastNetMon للبحث عن أنماط أوامر مريبة
4. تدقيق سجلات وصول جهاز MikroTik للأوامر غير المصرح بها
إرشادات التصحيح:
1. راقب مستودع FastNetMon على GitHub للإصدار المصحح (ترقية إلى 1.3.0 أو أحدث عند توفره)
2. لا يوجد تصحيح رسمي حالياً؛ طبّق الضوابط البديلة فوراً
3. اشترك في تنبيهات أمان FastNetMon
الضوابط البديلة:
1. استبدل استدعاءات exec() بـ file_put_contents() للتسجيل
2. استخدم escapeshellarg() على جميع متغيرات $msg
3. طبّق التحقق الصارم من صحة المدخلات على معاملات سطر الأوامر
4. قم بتشغيل FastNetMon بامتيازات محدودة (مستخدم غير جذر)
5. طبّق قواعد جدار الحماية لحجب أنماط حقن الأوامر
قواعد الكشف:
1. راقب استدعاءات exec() بمتغيرات غير معقمة في ملف MikroTik plugin
2. تنبيه عند توليد عملية FastNetMon لعمليات فرعية غير متوقعة
3. راقب سجلات النظام للأوامر التي تحتوي على أحرف shell metacharacters
4. قواعس IDS/IPS للكشف عن أنماط حقن الأوامر
5. مراقبة سلامة الملفات على fastnetmon_mikrotik.php
📋 Regulatory Compliance Mapping
🟢 NCA ECC 2024
ECC 2024 A.14.2.1 - Change management procedures for security patches
ECC 2024 A.12.6.1 - Management of technical vulnerabilities
ECC 2024 A.14.3.1 - Segregation of development, test and production environments
🔵 SAMA CSF
SAMA CSF ID.RA-1 - Asset management and vulnerability identification
SAMA CSF PR.IP-12 - Security patch management
SAMA CSF DE.CM-1 - Detection and monitoring of security events
🟡 ISO 27001:2022
ISO 27001:2022 A.12.6.1 - Management of technical vulnerabilities
ISO 27001:2022 A.14.2.1 - Change management
ISO 27001:2022 A.12.3.1 - Segregation of duties
ISO 27001:2022 A.12.4.1 - Installation of software on operational systems
🟣 PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 6.2 - Ensure security patches are installed within defined timeframe
PCI DSS 11.2 - Run automated vulnerability scanning tools regularly
🔗 References & Sources 3
🔗
https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon
cve@mitre.org
Product
🔗
https://github.com/pavel-odintsov/fastnetmon/blob/master/src/mikrotik_plugin/fastnetmon...
cve@mitre.org
Product
🔗
https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48695-mikrotik-cmd-injection
cve@mitre.org
Third Party Advisory
📦 Affected Products / CPE 1 entries
pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon